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Abstract: As a result of recent work on historical national accounting, it is now possible to 
establish firmly the timing of the Great Divergence of living standards between Europe and 
Asia. There was a European Little Divergence as Britain and Holland overtook Italy and 
Spain, and an Asian Little Divergence as Japan overtook China and India. The Great 
Divergence occurred because Japan grew more slowly than Britain and Holland, starting from 
a lower level. Key turning points are identified around 1348 and 1500, and an explanatory 
framework is developed that can explain these divergences via the differential impact of 
shocks on differently structured economies. The key shocks were the Black Death of the mid-
fourteenth century and the new trade routes which opened up from Europe to Asia and the 
Americas at the end of the fifteenth century. The key structural factors were the type of 
agriculture, the age of first marriage of females, the flexibility of labour supply and the nature 
of state institutions.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The debate over the Great Divergence of productivity and living standards between Europe 
and Asia has had a remarkable impact on the economic history profession. For more than a 
century, economic historians had worked within a general framework where the Industrial 
Revolution was seen as the culmination of a process of gradual improvement, beginning in 
the late middle ages and continuing through the early modern period. As Europe transformed 
its institutions and accumulated capital, Asia stagnated and began to fall behind. The 
Industrial Revolution and nineteenth century colonialism were seen as accelerating this 
process of divergence, but were not seen as its fundamental causes. Pomeranz (2000) 
questioned what he saw as the Eurocentric bias of this account, claiming that as late as 1800, 
the Yangzi Delta region of China was as developed as Britain and Holland, the richest parts 
of Europe. Other parts of Asia were also seen as equally developed at the end of the 
eighteenth century. This chimed with the work of Frank (1998) and other economic historians 
working in California, and became known as the California School. Parthasarathi (1998) has 
claimed parity of living standards with Britain for South India during the late eighteenth 
century, while Hanley (1983) has argued for high living standards in nineteenth century 
Japan.  
 
However, one feature of this work was that it was not generally based on systematic 
analysis of data, despite the fundamentally quantitative nature of the revisionist claims being 
made. The last decade has seen tremendous progress in the extension of quantitative 
economic history both back in time and across space to cover Asia as well as Europe, and this 
paper draws on this work to provide an account of the Great Divergence. The word 
“accounting” is used in two ways in this paper, embracing both measurement and 
explanation. The firmest conclusions will be in the area of measurement, because that is 
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where most progress has been made recently, but there have also been advances in 
understanding the explanatory factors leading to the Great Divergence. 
 
This paper argues that the revisionist authors of the California School have massively 
exaggerated the development level of the most advanced Asian economies in 1800, so that 
their most striking claim turns out to be false. Nevertheless, the California School has had an 
enduring effect on economic history. It would now be impossible to make a serious 
comparison between Europe and Asia without emphasising regional variations within both 
continents. Much of this paper hinges on regional differences within both continents, and 
these differences were barely visible in the literature as recently as a decade ago. Although 
the Great Divergence between Europe and Asia had its origins in the late medieval period and 
was already well under way in the early modern period, as in the traditional economic history 
literature, there was a great deal of regional diversity, as suggested by the California School. 
Within Europe, there was a massive reversal of fortunes between the North Sea Area and 
Mediterranean Europe. This is sometimes known as the Little Divergence, and involved 
Britain and Holland overtaking Italy and Spain. Within Asia, there also seems to have been a 
reversal of fortunes with Japan overtaking China and India in another Little Divergence. 
Although this account therefore suggests some similarities between Japan and the North Sea 
Area, which seems consistent with the views of the California School, it is important to bear 
in mind that Japan started from a lower level and grew at a slower rate than the North Sea 
Area, and thus continued to fall behind until after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. This means 
that a Great Divergence was occurring between Europe and Asia at the same time as the 
Little Divergences within both continents. 
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As well as quantifying the timing of the Great Divergence in terms of GDP per capita 
comparisons, this paper also offers an account of the Great Divergence, in the sense of 
explanation. The framework adopted here is to see the divergences as arising from the 
differential impact of shocks hitting economies with different structures. The first structural 
factor is the mixed agriculture with a large pastoral component that helped to put the North 
Sea Area on a path to high-value-added, capital-intensive, non-human-energy-intensive 
production (Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2011). The second 
structural factor is the high female age of first marriage in the North Sea Area, which led to 
lower fertility and more investment in human capital (de Moor and van Zanden, 2011). The 
third factor is the flexibility of labour supply. Although it is possible to point to an 
“industrious revolution” in the North Sea Area, which helps to explain the Little Divergence 
within Europe, the term was first coined in the context of Japan during the Tokugawa 
Shogunate, and thus has less role in explaining the Great Divergence between Europe and 
Asia (de Vries, 2008; Hayami, 1967). The fourth structural factor is institutions, with the role 
of the state helping to explain the success of the North Sea Area through the growth of state 
capacity, but balanced by constraints on the executive (Epstein, 2000; O’Brien, 2011; 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). Two shocks played an important role in the 
process of divergence. First, the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century led to a 
permanent upward shift of per capita incomes in the North Sea Area, which did not occur in 
the rest of Europe or Asia (Epstein, 2000; Allen, 2001). Second, the new trade routes which 
opened up from Europe to Asia and the Americas accelerated the process of divergence. Both 
shocks had long-lasting effects through their interaction with structural features of the 
different economies. 
 
2. MEASURING ECONOMIC GROWTH BEFORE 1870 
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Until recently, most accounts of economic growth before 1870 were largely qualitative. That 
changed with Maddison’s (2001), The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, published 
shortly after Pomeranz’s (2000) The Great Divergence. However, there is a large amount of 
“guesstimation” in the Maddison (2010) data set, with a number of observations set at or 
close to $400 in 1990 international prices. This is equivalent to most people living at “bare 
bones subsistence”, or the World Bank poverty level of $1 per day, with a small rich elite on 
top. Furthermore, Maddison provides his conjectural estimates only for a small number of 
years. Table 1 sets out Maddison’s estimates for the four European countries and the three 
Asian countries which will be the focus of attention in this paper. The four European 
countries have been chosen to include the richest parts of Europe in the late middle ages 
(Italy and Spain) and in the modern period (Holland and Britain). Similarly, the Asian 
economies have been chosen to include the richest parts of Asia in the early part of the 
second millennium (China) and in the modern period (Japan). Recently, however, economic 
historians have begun to produce estimates of per capita income in a national accounting 
framework, based on hard data, and a firmer picture has begun to emerge of the contours of 
long run growth and development in both Europe and Asia. This is possible because medieval 
and early modern Europe and Asia were much more literate and numerate than is often 
thought, and left behind a wealth of data in documents such as government accounts, customs 
accounts, poll tax returns, parish registers, city records, trading company records, hospital 
and educational establishment records, manorial accounts, probate inventories, farm 
accounts, tithe files. With a national accounting framework and careful cross-checking, it is 
possible to reconstruct population and GDP back to the medieval period. 
 
2.1 Europe’s Little Divergence 
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For some European countries, abundant quantitative information has survived, so that 
historical national accounts can be constructed on a sectoral basis in great detail. Britain and 
Holland have the best data, with historical national accountants able to build on decades of 
detailed data processing by generations of scholars as well as well-stocked archives 
(Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2011; van Zanden and van 
Leeuwen, 2012). For other countries, where information is more limited, or where there has 
been less processing of existing data, Malanima (2011), Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la 
Escosura (2013) and others have developed a short-cut method for reconstructing GDP. In the 
short-cut method, the economy is first divided between agriculture and non-agriculture. In the 
agricultural sector, output is estimated via a demand function, making use of data on 
population, real wages and the relative price of food, together with elasticities derived from 
later periods and the experience of other less developed economies. An allowance can also be 
made for international trade in food. For the non-agricultural sector, output is assumed to 
have moved in line with the urban population, but with some allowance made for rural 
industry and the phenomenon of agro-towns. This output-based GDP is helpful in bridging 
the gap between the macro approach of growth economists and the sectoral approach of much 
economic history.  
 
The new estimates based on historical national accounting, presented here in Table 2, 
revise upwards the level of per capita GDP in the medieval period. Medieval western Europe 
was substantially richer than Maddison thought, and subsequent growth therefore more 
gradual. The British data from Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen 
(2011) cover the territory of England before 1700 and Great Britain after 1700, while the 
Dutch data from van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) cover the territory of Holland before 
1807 and the Netherlands after 1807. The Italian data from Malanima (2011) cover central 
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and northern Italy, excluding the south, while the data of Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la 
Escosura (2013) cover the territory of modern Spain.  
 
Note that before the Black Death in 1348, per capita incomes were substantially 
higher in Italy and Spain than in England and Holland. There then followed a reversal of 
fortunes between the North Sea Area and Mediterranean Europe, so that by 1800 per capita 
incomes were substantially higher in Great Britain and the Netherlands than in Italy and 
Spain. Note that Italy, England and Holland all experienced a substantial increase in per 
capita incomes across the Black Death, as population fell sharply. However, Spain did not 
share in this Malthusian response to the Black Death, and although Italian incomes increased 
in the short run, they fell back to pre-Black Death levels as population growth returned after 
1450. The Little Divergence then occurred with a surge of per capita incomes in the North 
Sea Area, led initially by Holland during its Golden Age of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, then by Britain during its Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
 
One other point is worth noting from the annual data plotted in Figures 1 and 2. This 
is the alternation of periods of positive and negative growth, with growth booms typically 
followed by growth reversals, leaving little or no long run progress in the level of per capita 
incomes over the long run. This is particularly clear in the cases of Italy and Spain in Figure 
1, where per capita GDP fluctuated without trend between 1270 and 1850. For the cases of 
Britain and Holland in Figure 2, although there are alternating periods of positive and 
negative growth until the eighteenth century, there is also a clear upward trend, with the gains 
following the Black Death being retained, and the growth reversals eventually disappearing 
with the transition to modern economic growth. It should be noted that the apparent 
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downward jump in the level of Dutch GDP per capita in the early nineteenth century is purely 
the result of a discontinuity in the data, switching from the territory of the province of 
Holland to the whole of the Netherlands. One way to think about Europe’s Little Divergence, 
and also the Great Divergence, is therefore not so much the beginnings of growth, but rather 
the weakening and ending of growth reversals. 
 
2.2 Asia’s Little Divergence 
Data are available in abundance for some Asian economies for some time periods, but there 
has been relatively little work so far processing this material. Much Chinese data still needs 
to be processed, but it is now possible to produce annual estimates of GDP from the output 
side, apart from during dynastic changes (Broadberry, Guan and Li, 2013). Japan also has a 
wealth of data, but at this stage the estimates are closer in spirit to the short-cut methods used 
for Italy and Spain than to the full output-based estimates for Britain and Holland (Bassino, 
Broadberry, Fukao, Gupta and Takashima, 2012). Indian data are less abundant, and it has so 
far only been possible to produce estimates back to 1600 (Broadberry, Custodis and Gupta, 
2013). Apart from Abū ’l-Fazl’s [1595] remarkable document, The Ā’ īn–i-Akbarī,  from the 
highpoint of the Mughal Empire, most of the information about India comes from the records 
of the European East India Companies and the British Raj. 
 
The results for Asia in Table 3, like those for Europe in Table 2, suggest an upward 
revision of early GDP per capita compared with Maddison’s estimates. However, Japan had 
very low levels of per capita GDP at the start of the second millennium, then experienced 
modest but steady growth at 0.06% per annum through to the mid-nineteenth century. Japan’s 
more dynamic growth after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 thus built on this earlier progress. 
China’s per capita GDP, by contrast, was on a downward trajectory from its high-point 
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during the Northern Song Dynasty, when China was the world’s per capita income leader. On 
these estimates, Japan overtook China during the seventeenth century. India shared in the 
Chinese pattern of declining per capita GDP from 1600, at the height of the Mughal Empire 
under Akbar. However, Japan was already slightly ahead of India by the time the Indian 
series starts in 1600. 
 
The Asian Little Divergence thus parallels the European Little Divergence quite 
closely. Indeed, if the North Sea Area economies of Britain, Holland and Belgium (Flanders) 
are aggregated together, they show a continuous upward trajectory from the mid-fourteenth to 
the mid-nineteenth century, much as in Japan, led initially by a growth surge in Flanders, 
followed by surges in Holland and then in Britain. And just as stagnation and decline 
characterised Europe outside the North Sea Area at this time, so too there was stagnation and 
decline in Asia outside Japan. Of course, China is a large economy, and it would be desirable 
to disaggregate further, in the spirit of the California School, to see whether the Yangzi Delta 
was on a par with Japan until the nineteenth century, for example.  
 
Li and van Zanden (2012) have produced a comparison of GDP per capita in the 
Yangzi Delta and the Netherlands in the early nineteenth century, finding per capita incomes 
in the Yangzi Delta to be 53.8 per cent of the level in the Netherlands during the 1820s. This 
suggests a per capita GDP figure of around $1,050 for the Lower Yangzi, in 1990 
international dollars, slightly above the Japanese level at this time. Note also that a recent 
paper by Roy (2010) produces an estimate of GDP per capita for Bengal, the first part of 
India to fall under British control. Roy finds that per capita incomes in Bengal were around 
20 per cent of the British level in the 1760s. This is a bit lower than the average suggested by 
Broadberry, Custodis and Gupta (2012) for India as a whole, falling from 34 per cent in 1750 
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to 27 per cent by 1801. However, this would be expected for a relatively poor region such as 
Bengal. 
 
2.3 The Great Divergence 
Table 4 puts together the new GDP per capita estimates for Europe and Asia from Tables 2 
and 3, to provide a focus on the Great Divergence. Although China was richer than England 
in 1086, it must be remembered that England was a relatively poor part of Europe in the 
eleventh century. Comparing China with the richest part of medieval Europe, it seems likely 
that Italy was already ahead by 1300. However, care needs to be taken here, since a smaller 
region of China such as the Yangzi Delta may still have been on a par with Italy in 1500, 
which would be consistent with the accounts given in the earlier, qualitative literature. This 
would only require per capita incomes in the Yangzi Delta to have been around 54 per cent 
higher than in China as a whole, which is broadly consistent with the scale of regional 
differences within China during the nineteenth century.  
 
However, with the rise of Holland during its Golden Age, there can be little doubt that 
the Great Divergence was already well underway during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. By this stage, the discrepancy between the aggregates for China and Holland is too 
large to be bridged by regional variation. It is worth noting that Pomeranz (2011) now accepts 
that his earlier claim of China on a par with Europe as late as 1800 was exaggerated, and he 
now settles for the earlier date of 1700, when Table 4 suggests that allowing for regional 
variation would still put the Yangzi delta substantially behind a large part of Western Europe. 
 
But the key finding to emphasise from Table 4 is that Japan was following a similar 
trajectory to the North Sea Area, but at a much lower level, and with a slower rate of growth, 
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so that Japan continued to fall behind the West until after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. This 
means that there was a Little Divergence within Europe led by the North Sea Area and Little 
Divergence within Asia led by Japan. But since the frontier was moving out faster in Europe 
than in Asia, the Great Divergence between the two continents was also occurring. 
 
3. EXPLAINING EUROPE’S LITTLE DIVERGENCE 
The second way of accounting for the Great Divergence is to provide an explanatory 
framework. Armed with the estimates of economic growth before 1870 from Table 4, this 
paper now turns to explanation. A common framework of shocks and structural factors will 
be adopted for analysing the Little Divergences within Europe and Asia, as well as the Great 
Divergence between the two continents. The key shocks were the Black Death of the mid-
fourteenth century, and the new trade routes that opened up from Europe to Asia and the 
Americas around 1500. They had differential effects on different European economies 
because of four structural factors: the structure of agriculture; marriage patterns and fertility; 
the flexibility of labour supply; institutions and the role of the state. 
 
3.1 Agriculture 
The success of the North Sea Area may be linked to the structure of its agriculture, which was 
more animal oriented than on the rest of the continent, with a large pastoral farming 
component. The data for England are shown in Table 5. In current prices the share of the 
pastoral sector was already above 50 per cent after the Black Death, and was more than 60 
per cent by the mid-fifteenth century. Although the share declined between the 1450s and the 
1650s, much of this was due to an increase in the relative price of grain following the return 
of population growth. In constant 1700 prices, there was an upward trend in the share of the 
pastoral sector, with just a gentle setback between the mid-fifteenth and mid-seventeenth 
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centuries. To put things in perspective, the pastoral share of agricultural value added in India 
in the early twentieth century was around 20 per cent (Sivasubramonian, 2000). 
 
The importance of pastoral agriculture in the North Sea Area had a number of 
important implications for future growth. Although this did not create more kilocalories per 
person, it meant that food was more processed than in other societies (Allen, 2009; 
Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2011). North Sea Area agriculture 
thus had a number of characteristics that were important for future growth (Broadberry, 
Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2011). First, this was a high-value-added 
agriculture; even if it did not produce many more kilocalories per head than arable 
agriculture, the food was more highly processed. Second, this was a highly capital-intensive 
agriculture, with animals making up a large share of the capital stock. Third, this was an 
agriculture which was highly intensive in the use of non-human energy. The North Sea Area 
pulled ahead of Mediterranean Europe as high-value-added, capital-intensive, non-human-
energy-intensive techniques spread from agriculture to industry and services and as industry 
and services became more important with structural change. 
 
3.2 Marriage patterns and fertility 
Hajnal (1965) argued that northwest Europe had a different demographic regime from the rest 
of the European continent, characterised by later marriage and hence limited fertility. 
Although he originally called this the European Marriage Pattern, later work established that 
it applied only to the northwest of the continent. This can be linked to labour market 
opportunities for females, which de Moor and van Zanden (2010) link in turn to pastoral 
agriculture. Fewer children are associated with more investment in human capital, both for 
the females engaged in market activity before marriage, and for the children because of the 
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“quantity-quality” trade-off (Voigtländer and Voth, 2010). Development in the North Sea 
Area was characterised by human- as well as physical-capital intensity (Baten and van 
Zanden, 2008). 
 
3.3 Flexibility of labour supply 
Another difference between northwest Europe and southern Europe which has received 
attention in the literature is the flexibility of the supply of labour by individuals. This idea can 
be traced back originally to Max Weber (1930) and the protestant ethic. However, its most 
recent variant is the “Industrious Revolution”, a term widely associated with de Vries’s 
(1994) work on Europe, but actually coined by Hayami (1967) working on Japan. The basic 
idea is that people worked harder to obtain new goods made available by long distance trade 
and industrial innovation. Following the Reformation, the number of holidays in Europe was 
reduced by around 50 per year, and during the Industrial Revolution, St Monday, the practice 
of tolerating people not turning up for work on the first day of the week, disappeared, 
removing another 50 holidays per year. Table 6 sets out the empirical evidence on annual 
days worked per person in England, which approximately doubled from around 165 in the 
fifteenth century to around 330 in the nineteenth century. This can be seen as increasing 
labour intensity in the short run, but as incomes increased, savings also rose, providing funds 
for investment and thus allowing an increase in capital intensity in the long run. 
 
3.4 Institutions and the role of the state 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) explain the success of Britain and Holland after 
1500, together with the failure of Spain and Portugal, through institutional constraints on 
executive power. In Britain and Holland, constraints on rulers were sufficient to ensure that 
they were unable to act arbitrarily in their dealings with merchants. In Spain and Portugal, by 
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contrast, rulers were sufficiently strong to prevent a strong merchant class from constraining 
their powers to intervene in business matters. This view is not universally accepted, however. 
For example, Epstein (2000) argues that state power was fragmented in the medieval period, 
with market integration hindered by the “freedoms” granted to interests such as towns and 
guilds, so that what was needed for growth was centralisation of state power and expansion of 
state capacity rather than constraints on the executive. The two views can be reconciled once 
it is recognised that a balance is needed between having a state that is strong enough to 
enforce property rights but not so strong that can it can appropriate all the gains from trade.  
 
There is empirical evidence to back up both aspects of the role of state institutions in 
the European Little Divergence. Early modern Britain and Holland dominated Spain and 
Portugal in terms of both the control exercised by mercantile interests over the state through 
parliament and the ability of the state to raise taxes that allowed for an expansion of state 
capacity. Table 7 shows very different patterns of parliamentary activity in the North Sea 
Area and Mediterranean Europe from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries. The index of 
parliamentary activity constructed by van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker (2012) is based on the 
calendar years per century in which parliament met. During the first half of the second 
millennium, Parliamentary activity was higher in Spain and Portugal than in the North Sea 
Area. However, activity then peaked in the fifteenth or sixteenth century in Spain and 
Portugal before going into decline. In the North Sea Area, by contrast, although 
parliamentary activity was slow to get going, it continued to increase after 1500, reaching 
very high levels during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Table 8 on the ability of the 
state to raise fiscal revenue per capita shows a similar pattern of divergence between 
northwest Europe and the rest of the continent during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, with England and the Dutch Republic forging ahead.  
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3.5 The Black Death 
The catching-up process of the North Sea Area with Mediterranean Europe started with the 
arrival of the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century, which led to an increase of per 
capita incomes in most European countries. However, this typically Malthusian response to 
the mortality crisis was not experienced in Spain, and as per capita incomes declined with the 
return to population growth in Italy, they remained on a plateau in Britain and Holland as the 
North Sea Area broke out of the Malthusian trap.  
 
Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013) explain the absence of a per capita 
income increase in Spain by the high land-to-labour ratio in a frontier economy during the 
Reconquest. Instead of reducing pressure on scarce land resources, Spanish population 
decline destroyed commercial networks and further isolated an already scarce population, 
reducing specialisation and the division of labour. Thus Spain did not share in the general 
west European increase in per capita incomes after the Black Death. This is related to both 
the structure of agriculture and the capacity of state institutions.  
 
In the case of Italy, although per capita incomes did increase after the Black Death, 
the gains disappeared again after the return to population growth from 1450, in contrast to the 
consolidation of the gains in the North Sea Area. This can be linked to the lower age of 
marriage and higher fertility in Italy, as well as to the absence of an industrious revolution 
which might have sustained per capita incomes in the face of falling daily wages. Perhaps 
most importantly, however, Epstein (2000) attributes it to the weakness of the fragmented 
Italian states, which failed to provide an integrated market. 
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3.6 New trade routes 
The reversal of fortunes within Europe pivots around 1500, when per capita incomes were 
approximately $1,500 in both Italy and Holland. The North Sea Area forged ahead after 
1500, led initially by Holland during its Golden Age during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, and then by Britain during the Industrial Revolution. Economic historians have 
long pointed to long distance trade as playing an important role in this post-1500 Little 
Divergence, following the opening up of new trade routes to Asia around the south of Africa, 
and to the New World after Europe’s encounter with the Americas. It might be expected that 
Spain and Portugal would have been the gainers from these changes, since they were the 
pioneers and both had Atlantic as well as Mediterranean coasts. However, as noted above, 
early modern Britain and Holland dominated Spain and Portugal in terms of institutional 
structures, including both the ability of the state to raise taxes to finance the expansion of 
state capacity and the control exercised by mercantile interests over the state through 
parliament (O’Brien, 2011, Karaman and Pamuk, 2010; van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker, 
2012). 
 
4. ASIA’S LITTLE DIVERGENCE  
Although the idea of Chinese decline since the Song Dynasty is not new, and Japanese post-
Meiji growth is widely seen as building upon foundations laid in the Tokugawa Shogunate, 
there is no literature on an Asian Little Divergence (Needham, 1954; O’Brien, 2009; Hayami, 
Saito and Toby, 2004). Here, the parallels with the European Little Divergence are drawn out.  
 
4.1 Agriculture 
Agriculture was much less animal oriented in both China and Japan than in Europe, so this 
factor would seem better suited to explaining the Great Divergence between Asia and Europe 
17 
 
rather than to accounting for the differing performances of China, Japan and India during the 
Asian Little Divergence. 
 
4.2 Marriage patterns 
Marriage patterns do have an important role to play in explaining the Asian Little Divergence 
as well as the Great Divergence. Hajnal (1965) pointed to the different marriage pattern in 
northwest Europe compared with the rest of Europe, and although the female age of first 
marriage in China and India was much lower, Japan was an intermediate case, closer to the 
experience of northwest Europe, as can be seen in Table 9. The average age was 22.1 in 
Tokugawa Japan, compared with 25.4 in early modern England, but 18.6 in late Ming and 
Qing China and just 13.0 in modern India.  
 
4.3 Flexibility of labour supply 
This later marriage in Japan can also be linked to the labour force participation of women, 
which underpinned an industrious revolution. This may at first sight seem surprising, given 
the small scale of pastoral agriculture in Japan compared with the North Sea Area. However, 
in the case of Japan, the labour market opportunities for women were provided by 
protoindustrial work, particularly in the silk industry, and later in cotton textiles. Although de 
Vries (1994) was influenced by Hayami’s (1967) work on Tokugawa Japan when arguing for 
an industrious revolution in Europe, on closer inspection, Hayami’s interpretation is a bit 
different for Japan. Indeed, Hayami and Tsubouchi(1989) generalised the idea to an East 
Asian industrious revolution, based on rice cultivation, which was seen as the basis of an 
alternative to western capital-intensive industrialisation. This idea was picked up by 
Pomeranz (2000: 91-106), who argued for a Chinese industrious revolution. However, Huang 
(2002) argues that this is a misinterpretation of what he calls “involution”. For Huang, 
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Chinese over-population led to smaller landholdings, driving women to work in proto-
industry just to remain at subsistence. This leaves out the crucial demand side of de Vries’s 
notion of an industrious revolution, with people working harder to be able to consume luxury 
goods. In Western Europe and Japan, harder work brought rising household incomes and 
consumption per head.  
 
4.4 Institutions and the role of the state 
Asian states are usually portrayed as more centralised and autocratic than European states, 
and thus holding back Asian economic development (Jones, 1981; Landes, 1998). Within 
Asia, however, it would be difficult to attribute Japanese overtaking of China to the success 
of Japanese merchants in imposing constraints on the executive, as Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson’s (2005) analysis would seem to imply. Similarly, it would be difficult to attribute 
India’s decline to the failure of merchants to tame powerful rulers, given the weakness of 
Indian states during the early modern period (Parthasarathi, 2011). Indeed, it seems clear that 
merchants in the Indian Ocean trade operated in an environment where states were unable to 
enforce basic property rights, and where piracy was a major problem (Prange, 2011). The 
Asian evidence thus seems to be more consistent with the concerns of Epstein (2000) and 
O’Brien (2011) over the need to build up state capacity rather than Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson’s (2005) concerns over the need to impose constraints on the executive. Indeed, 
comparative data assembled by Sng and Moriguchi (2013) suggest substantially higher per 
capita tax revenue and provision of local public goods in Tokugawa Japan than in China 
between 1650 and 1850. However, it is clear that the success of Japan in expanding state 
capacity was not counterbalanced by an equivalent expansion of Parliamentary activity along 
European lines until after the Meiji restoration of 1868.  
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4.5 The Black Death 
There are no signs of a positive effect from the Black Death on per capita incomes in Asia, in 
contrast to Europe. This is not surprising in the case of Japan, which is known to have 
remained isolated from the Black Death. However, there was a large decline in China’s 
population during the fourteenth century, which did not have a positive effect on per capita 
GDP. The reason for this seems to be that this period coincided with the Mongol interlude, 
which destroyed the institutional framework that had underpinned the high per capita 
incomes of the Northern Song Dynasty. This reduced specialisation and the division of 
labour, so that China’s experience was closer to that of Spain than to that of England or 
Holland. 
 
4.6 New trade routes 
China adopted a restrictive closed door policy towards long distance trade after the “voyages 
to the western oceans” that had occurred between 1405 and 1433, which had shown China to 
be technologically ahead in shipbuilding (Fairbank, 1992: 137-140). However, following an 
initial period of openness to relations with European traders, Tokugawa Japan adopted a 
policy of sakoku or “seclusion” from the 1630s, so any Japanese advantage from the earlier 
Chinese turn inwards was short lived (Tashiro, 1982). Although recent work has tended to 
question the extent to which trade really was closed off by these policies, the contrast with 
the outward orientation of the European states which sponsored the voyages of discovery 
from the fifteenth century remains striking (van der Wee, 1990). This suggests that the new 
trade routes are of more importance in explaining the Great Divergence between Europe and 
Asia, than the Little Divergence within Asia.  
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With early modern China and Japan turned inwards, India was the most open to trade, 
with its major export business in cotton textiles (Chaudhuri, 1978). However, this did not 
lead to Indian prosperity because of the low levels of state capacity and its consequences for 
the enforcement of property rights (Prange, 2011; Parthasarathi, 2011).  
 
5. THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 
Putting together the above analysis of the European and Asian Little Divergences produces 
an explanatory framework for the Great Divergence that is sensitive to the regional variations 
within both continents, thus taking account of one of the hallmarks of the California School. 
The approach adopted here sees the divergences as arising from the interaction of a number 
of structural factors with two important shocks.  
 
The main structural factors can be listed as follows. First, different agricultural 
systems mattered. The large share of pastoral farming in agriculture put northwest Europe on 
a path to high-value-added, capital-intensive, non-human-energy-intensive production. These 
production characteristics then spread from agriculture to industry and services, which 
accounted for a growing share of output. Second, marriage patterns also mattered. The high 
female age of first marriage in northwest Europe led to lower fertility and more investment in 
human capital. Although female marriage was early in India and China, Japan was an 
intermediate case. Third, flexibility of the labour supply was more important in explaining 
the Little Divergences within Europe and Asia than the Great Divergence, since there were 
similarities between the industrious revolutions of the North Sea Area and Japan. Fourth, 
institutions were important in explaining the Great Divergence as well as the Little 
Divergences within Europe and Asia. In the North Sea Area, state capacity was able to 
expand, but at the same time merchants were able to exercise control over the state through 
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parliamentary activity. Although there was no parallel to this parliamentary control over the 
state in Asia before the late nineteenth century, Japan did succeed in building up state 
capacity.  
 
There were two key shocks which interacted with the structural differences to produce 
the Little and Great Divergences. First, the Black Death led to a permanent upward shift of 
GDP per capita in the North Sea Area, which did not occur in the rest of Europe or Asia. 
Second, the new trade routes that emerged around 1500 accelerated the divergences. Whereas 
European states encouraged the voyages of discovery, in Asia China and Japan turned 
inwards. Although India remained open, it lacked state capacity, so this did not lead to Indian 
prosperity. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper sets out to “account” for the Great Divergence between Europe and Asia, covering 
issues of both measurement and explanation. Dealing with measurement issues, there are a 
number of firm conclusions: (1) The traditional view, in which the Great Divergence had late 
medieval origins and was already well under way during the early modern period, is 
confirmed (2) However, revisionists are correct to point to regional variation within both 
continents (3) There was a Little Divergence within Europe, with a reversal of fortunes 
between the North Sea Area and Mediterranean Europe. (4) There was a Little Divergence 
within Asia, with Japan overtaking China and India. However, Japan started at a lower level 
of per capita income than the North Sea Area and grew at a slower rate, so continued to fall 
behind until after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. 
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The Little and Great Divergences are explained by the differential impact of shocks 
hitting economies with different structures. The structural factors include: (1) The large share 
of pastoral farming in agriculture, which helped to put the North Sea Area on the path to 
high-value-added, capital-intensive, non-human-energy intensive production. (2) Late 
marriage in the North Sea Area, which lowered fertility and encouraged human capital 
formation. (3) The flexibility of labour supply, with an industrious revolution helping to 
explain the Little Divergences within both Asia and Europe. The two key shocks were: (1) 
The Black Death, which  led to a permanent per capita income gain in the North Sea Area, 
but not in the rest of Eurasia. (2) The new trade routes which opened up from Europe to Asia 
and the Americas around 1500. 
 
More research is still needed, however. Although historical national accounting has 
now made a substantial contribution to understanding the Great Divergence, there is more to 
be done: (1) Historical national accounts are needed for more countries, reaching further back 
in time (2) More regional disaggregation is needed within large countries. (3) Much more 
work is needed to assemble comparative data on the explanatory variables (4) More attention 
needs to be paid to the case of Japan, the first Asian country to achieve modern economic 
growth, but which has been overshadowed in the Great Divergence debate by the focus on 
China. 
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TABLE 1: Maddison’s estimates of GDP per capita in Western Europe and Asia, 1000-
1870 (1990 international dollars) 
 
 UK NL Italy Spain Japan China India 
1000 400 425 450 450 425 466 450 
1500 714 761 1,100 661 500 600 550 
1600 974 1,381 1,100 853 520 600 550 
1700 1,250 2,130 1,100 853 570 600 550 
1820 1,706 1,838 1,117 1,008 669 600 533 
1870 3,190 2,757 1,499 1,207 737 530 533 
 
Sources and notes: Maddison (2010). The estimates are for countries within their modern 
boundaries, and hence cover the United Kingdom rather than Great Britain or England and 
the Netherlands rather than Holland. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: GDP per capita levels in Europe (1990 international dollars) 
 
 England/ 
GB 
Holland/ 
NL 
Italy Spain 
1086 754    
1270 759   957 
1300 755  1,482 957 
1348 777 876 1,376 1,030 
1400 1,090 1,245 1,601 885 
1450 1,055 1,432 1,668 889 
1500 1,114 1,483 1,403 889 
1570 1,143 1,783 1,337 990 
1600 1,123 2,372 1,244 944 
1650 1,100 2,171 1,271 820 
1700 1,630 2,403 1,350 880 
 1,563    
1750 1,710 2,440 1,403 910 
1800 2,080 2,617 1,244 962 
  1,752   
1820 2,133 1,953 1,376 1,087 
1850 2,997 2,397 1,350 1,144 
 
Sources and notes: England/Great Britain: Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van 
Leeuwen (2011); Broadberry and van Leeuwen (2011); Holland/Netherlands: van Zanden 
and van Leuwen (2012); Italy: Malanima (2011); Spain: Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la 
Escosura (2013). Figures are for 10-year averages starting in the stated year (i.e. 1270-79, 
1300-09,…) apart from 1348, which refers to the pre-Black Death years 1339-48.  
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FIGURE 1: Real GDP per capita in Italy and Spain 1270-1850 (1990 international 
dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Source: Malanima (2011); Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2012). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Real GDP per capita in Britain and Holland, 1270-1870 (1990 international 
dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Source: Broadberry, Campbell, van Leeuwen and van Zanden (2012). 
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TABLE 3: GDP per capita levels in Asia (1990 international dollars) 
 
 Japan China India 
725 483   
900 534   
980  1,247  
1020  1,518  
1050  1,458  
1086  1,204  
1120  1,063  
1150 603   
1280 560   
1300    
1400  960  
1450 554 983  
1500  1,127  
1570  968  
1600 791 977 682 
1650 838  638 
1700 879 841 622 
1750 818 685 573 
1800 876 597 569 
1850 933 594 556 
 
Sources and notes: Japan: Basssino, Broadberry, Fukao, Gupta and Takashima (2012); China: 
Broadberry, Guan and Li (2013); India: Broadberry, Custodis and Gupta (2013); Chinese data 
are for 10-year averages starting in the stated year (i.e. 980-89, 1086-95,…), but data for 
Japan and India are only available for benchmark years. 
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TABLE 4: GDP per capita levels in Europe and Asia (1990 international dollars) 
 
 England/
GB 
Holland/
NL 
Italy Spain Japan China India 
725     483   
900     534   
980      1,247  
1020      1,518  
1050      1,458  
1086 754     1,204  
1120      1,063  
1150     603   
1280 679   957 560   
1300 755  1,482 957    
1348 777 876 1,376 1,030    
1400 1,090 1,245 1,601 885  960  
1450 1,055 1,432 1,668 889 554 983  
1500 1,114 1,483 1,403 889  1,127  
1570 1,143 1,783 1,337 990  968  
1600 1,123 2,372 1,244 944 791 977 682 
1650 1,110 2,171 1,271 820 838  638 
1700 1,563 1,403 1,350 880 879 841 622 
1750 1,710 2,440 1,403 910 818 685 573 
1800 2,080 1,752 1,244 962 876 597 569 
1850 2,997 2,397 1,350 1,144 933 594 556 
 
Sources: Tables 2 and 3. 
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TABLE 5: Share of pastoral sector in English agricultural value added, 10-year 
averages (%) 
 
 At current 
prices 
At constant 
1700 prices 
1270s 39.9 30.8 
1300s 48.8 33.6 
1350s 51.2 46.7 
1400s 53.7 42.5 
1450s 61.6 46.9 
   
1550s 41.9 39.5 
1600s 41.9 41.2 
1650s 35.5 36.0 
1700s 40.3 38.5 
1750s 42.2 45.4 
1800s 51.5 54.7 
1850s 55.2 55.8 
1860s 60.0 55.7 
 
Sources: (Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2011). 
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TABLE 6: Annual days worked per person in England 
 
Period Blanchard/Allen 
and Weisdorf 
Clark and 
van der Werf 
Voth 
1433 165   
1536 180   
1560-1599  257  
1578 260   
1584 210   
1598 259   
1600-1649  266  
1650-1699  276  
1685  312  
1700-1732  286  
1733-1736  295  
1760   258 
1771  280  
1800   333 
1830   336 
1867-1869  293-311  
1870  318  
 
Sources and notes: 1433-1598: derived by Allen and Weisdorf (2011: 721) from Blanchard 
(1978: 24) as the number of days worked in agriculture (135) plus the share of the 
remaining130 workdays spent in mining; 1560-1599 to 1870: Clark and van der Werf (1998: 
838); 1760-1830: Voth (2001: 1078). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: Activity index of European parliaments, 12th to 18th centuries (calendar years 
per century in which parliament met) 
 
 12th  13th  14th  15th  16th  17th  18th  
North Sea Area        
England 0 6 78 67 59 73 100 
Scotland 0 0 10 61 96 59 93 
Netherlands 0 0 0 20 80 100 100 
        
Mediterranean        
Castile and Leon 2 30 59 52 66 48 7 
Catalonia 3 29 41 61 16 14 4 
Aragon 2 25 38 41 19 11 1 
Valencia 0 7 28 29 12 4 0 
Navarre 2 7 17 33 62 30 20 
Portugal 0 9 27 47 12 14 0 
 
Source: van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker (2012: online appendix S1). 
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TABLE 8: Per capita fiscal revenues, 1500/09 to 1780/89 (grams of silver) 
 
 1500/09 1550/59 1600/09 1650/59 1700/09 1750/59 1780/89 
Dutch Republic   76.2 114.0 210.6 189.4 228.2 
England 5.5 8.9 15.2 38.7 91.9 109.1 172.3 
France 7.2 10.9 18.1 56.5 43.5 48.7 77.6 
Spain 12.9 19.1 62.6 57.3 28.6 46.2 59.0 
Venice 27.5 29.6 37.5 42.5 46.3 36.2 42.3 
Austria    10.6 15.6 23.0 43.0 
Russia     6.3 14.9 26.7 
Prussia   2.4 9.0 24.6 53.2 35.0 
Ottoman Empire  5.6 5.8 7.4 8.0 9.1 7.1 
Poland 1.5 0.9 1.6 5.0 1.2 0.8 11.2 
 
Source: Karaman and Pamuk (2010: 611). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: Female age of first marriage 
 
 Period Range Unweighted 
average 
England 1600-1849 23.4 to 26.5 25.4 
Japan 1680-1860 18.8 to 24.6 22.1 
China 1550-1931 17.2 to 20.7 18.6 
India 1911-1931 12.9 to 13.3 13.0 
 
Sources: Wrigley and Schofield (1987: 255); Mosk (1980: 476); Lee and Wang (1999: 67); 
Bhat and Halli (1999: 137). 
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